What do Russians think about Poland? Is Russia afraid of Poland?
In the Kultura Liberalna podcast, I talk with Jakub Bodziany about how Russia perceives Poland and why "Polish imperialism" is a convenient tool for the Kremlin rather than a real fear. I explain why Russian proposals to partition Ukraine are a cynical trap, how the new social contract based on prosperity makes Putinism more durable than the USSR, and what we can realistically count as success in relations with Russia.
Russia wants to pull "Polish imperialism out of history's dustbin," but it does so to our detriment. For us, the word "empire" carries negative connotations; for Russians, positive ones, so they assume Poland secretly dreams of a Commonwealth reaching Lviv, Kyiv, and Minsk. Hence the proposals to partition Ukraine, such as those presented by Medvedev against the backdrop of a giant map. It is a trap: if we actually reached for western Ukraine, our credibility in international structures would drop to zero, and we would face Russia one on one. And in such confrontations, as 300 years of history show, Russia usually won against us by betting on marginal forces: from the Targowica Confederation, through the Bolsheviks, to the communists installed in 1945. Importantly, contrary to our beliefs, Poland is not at the centre of the Kremlin's attention. Analysis of presidential documents since 1999 shows we appear only in the third dozen of mentions, usually during moments of "anti-Polish eruption."
I interpret the current aggression as an attempt to revise the "shameful peace," referring to Vladislav Surkov's text "The End of the Shameful Peace" published just before the invasion. Russia wants to move beyond the borders imposed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, and treats the collapse of the USSR as a historical injustice. Hence Putin's aversion to Lenin, whom he blames for planting a "time bomb" by granting republics the right to secede. What stabilizes this system? Prosperity unprecedented in Russian history. Putin "bought" Russians with a lifestyle: holidays in Egypt, access to consumer goods. The war today is run with capitalist methods: a million rubles just for signing a contract, debt cancellation, a salary of around 8,000 zlotys against a median income in Buryatia of 800-1,000 zlotys. Governors have wartime KPIs to meet. It is a "war of the poor" from Russia's provinces.
My conclusion is pragmatic. From the perspective of Polish interests, a "less aggressive" Russia, one that does not threaten its neighbours, would already be a major success. Economically Russia is sliding into stagnation, with over 400,000 dead and more than a million wounded, and surveys show society would like the war to end. This can generate frustration. A democratic Russia would require "reinventing it," probably in exile, along with concrete tools like new school textbooks. But I warn against naive faith in rapid democratization under a new elite, such as Yulia Navalnaya. Russia is too large and economically attractive a structure for the West not to want to return to it, and Warsaw must learn to play this politically.