Russia and its history. Four episode about the myth that kills.
In two episodes of the Podróż bez Paszportu podcast, I talk with Mateusz Grzeszczuk about how Russia builds historical myths and turns them into fuel for imperial aggression. These are conversations about where Russia's obsession with Crimea comes from and why 9 May is not a holiday but a weapon.
Ep. 1. The USSR collapsed "for free." Why do Russian elites dream of bloody revenge?
I start from the distinction between academic history, which seeks truth, and functional history, which politicians use as a tool of persuasion. Within the Russian elite there is a genuine, not merely cynical, sense of the "geopolitical catastrophe" of the USSR's collapse. For a country that expanded territorially for 500 years, losing land without a single shot in 1991 is a "shameful peace" to be ended by force. Vladislav Surkov put it plainly in his text "The End of the Shameful Peace" just before the invasion. The war against Ukraine is presented not as an invasion but as "gathering the Russian lands" and righting a historical wrong. It is the generational experience of the 60-plus elite, which makes reaching an understanding with them nearly impossible.
Ep. 2. The cult of the KGB and NKVD. Why does today's Russia venerate perpetrators, not victims?
I show why the state's contemporary identity rests on the ethos of the security services, from which Putin emerged. The state defends the NKVD and KGB because it sees them as the foundation of unity and strength. This is why invoking the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact or Katyn is penalized: it destroys the coherent image of the Great Patriotic War as a struggle of pure good against evil. A second thread is the commercialization of history. Vladimir Medinsky, a "history entrepreneur," made a fortune popularizing myths, while investments like the Rzhev memorial at 650 million rubles serve to legitimize power. What I call "grant patriotism" turns memory politics into a profitable business for loyal officials.
Ep. 3. Byzantium, Catherine II, and Putin. How Russia has falsified Crimea's history for centuries
I devote this episode to the "Crimean fetish," Putin's greatest historical-policy success, which won over even Elon Musk to Russia's arguments. The narrative of Crimea's "eternal Russianness" is an academic falsehood: the peninsula belonged to Russia for only 171 years. It was Catherine II and Potemkin who, after 1783, gave conquered towns Greek-sounding names, Simferopol or Yevpatoria, to suggest succession from Byzantium and ancient Rome. I also explain that Ukraine's surrender of nuclear warheads in 1994 was not naivety but an attempt to cut the "imperial umbilical cord." Refusing to recognize Crimea's annexation carries crucial legal weight, much like the doctrine of non-recognition of the Baltic states' annexation in 1940.
Ep. 4. Soviet Armor. Kitsch and cash in the shadow of the Great Patriotic War
I take apart the cult of the Great Patriotic War, transformed into a new state religion. Stalin feared the cult of war because of his generals' popularity, but Putin made 9 May the foundation of national identity, uniting oligarchs with the provinces through authentic family trauma. Russia abandoned the European "never again" for the aggressive "we can do it again." A side effect is the grotesque "grant patriotism": in Syzran, students pushed cardboard tank models across a gymnasium while collecting state money. My conclusion is that revaluing 9 May, shifting from a military cult to intimate mourning, is a necessary condition for Russia's democratization. For now, the potential for such change is minimal.